Iran is “like a train without brakes and without reverse gear”. That is how the president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, describes his country’s determination to go ahead with its plans without considering the costs. The Iranian leader has also declared that Iran is “one of the strongest” nations in the region and a “great part of the world”.
Such statements are not promising considering the expected forthcoming negotiations with the United States on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme: they make it so difficult for any nation to deal with Iran and accept it as a trustworthy, reliable partner in negotiations.
Behind the typically emotional rhetoric lies well-calculated national interest, as the leadership may be seeking to whip up internal public support or gain greater leverage before sitting down at the negotiation table. Many observers argue that, slogans apart, Iranian policy can be rational when the country’s leadership understands the rules of the game. This was evident in 2003 when, just after the successful US invasion of Iraq and the removal of the Ba’ath regime, the Iranian leadership, fearing possible American action to undermine the regime in Tehran, decided to approach the US with a comprehensive offer to settle their differences.
The offer included a proposal to deal with all outstanding key issues that undermine relations between the two states. Among other things, Iran showed its readiness to ensure transparency in its nuclear programme, to support the disarmament of Hizbollah and to accept the two-state solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict, effectively recognising the existence of Israel. In return, Iran expected the US to recognise its legitimate security interests in the region, lift the unilateral US sanctions (among them the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996), ensure guaranteed access to civilian nuclear technology and withdraw the classification of Iran as a member of “the axis of evil”.
It is not likely that an Iranian offer made six years ago will still be on the table. The regional and international situation has changed fundamentally, and in Iran’s favour. The US has lost influence, power and credibility. Militarily, Washington has failed to secure a real victory in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Politically, the US has lost its credibility as a major power, and confidence and trust in America has diminished among regional allies. Today they anxiously watch the moves of the new American president and wait, with deep concern, to see how his actions follow his promises.
At the same time, Iran has enhanced its strategic position and power. During the past six years the Islamic Republic has emerged as a key player in major issues and conflicts directly affecting US strategic interests. It has emerged as a major player in Iraqi affairs, with direct links to political and religious groups and armed militias, which has placed Tehran in a unique position to influence future developments there. Iran has also emerged as a key player in Afghanistan. In other parts of the region, Iranian influence over the major non-state actors such Hizbollah and Hamas has increased. In short, Iran has secured an important position in all areas related to US security interests. Its help has become indispensable to the US.
Iranian strength derives and benefits from US weakness. The balance of power has changed in favour of Iran in every aspect and major developments have made the Iranian memorandum of 2003 outdated. From the Iranian standpoint, this memorandum can no longer serve as a starting point for negotiations. Equally, the ceiling for future Iranian demands for settlement could be much higher than before, corresponding with its new status. What will be offered to Barack Obama in 2009 is going to be different from what was offered to Mr Bush in 2003.
Yet the 2003 memorandum remains important, because it shows the issues that Iran considers negotiable and those that it does not. It demonstrates Iran’s rational decision-making based on the state’s national interests rather than on principles. The memorandum underlined that Iranian policies are negotiable on a tactical level, given the right incentives. Tehran might be persuaded to withdraw its support for Hizbollah or accept the Arab Peace Plan and the two-state solution if, in return, it is recognised as a regional power,allowed to continue with its nuclear programme and have friendly relations with the US.
To be sure, Iran will avoid giving any substantial concessions on strategic issues or anything that would undermine its position as a regional power. This includes the development of the nuclear programme, which is an essential part of Iranian regional ambition. In fact, the stronger geopolitical position of Iran in 2009 will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the US to persuade Tehran to give up its nuclear ambitions.
America’s hands are tied. In fact, the US may have to consider the possibility that Iran might be willing to negotiate most outstanding issues between the two states except one: the nuclear programme. It may have to risk starting negotiations with Iran on some of the other issues before, or even without, getting any meaningful concession on the nuclear issue.
Eventually, Mr Obama will be forced to consider his priorities and options. Would the US settle for a bargain with Iran in which Tehran would recognise Israel, stop its support to militant groups such Hizbollah and offer help in Iraq and Afghanistan, but keep its nuclear programme? Or would Mr Obama still keep military action against Iran as a serious option on the table?
This will be a difficult decision for the US administration. For some of the hardliners in Iran, however, it will not matter; abandoning nuclear enrichment is not an option. They believe that losing the nuclear programme through an Israeli or US military strike would be less painful than losing it through political or economic pressure from the US, the European Union or the United Nations.
Source: N. Stracke (The National)
July 14, 2009
